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ABSTRACT 
Most research on the topic of center-periphery relations focuses on the center as 
the locus of policy. This project, on the other hand, seeks to establish an alternative 
understanding of the ways in which nationality has played out both as a Russian tactic to 
unite disparate and diverse territories, and as a mode by which some ethnic minorities in 
Russian-ruled spaces have been able to secure relative autonomy. The Republic of 
Tatarstan, located in the Volga River basin, has achieved unprecedented levels of 
autonomy while existing as a contingent part of the USSR, and now the Russian 
Federation. Comparisons have been drawn between Tatarstan and Chechnya in regards to 
the political, economic, and cultural autonomy they exercise on their respective 
territories; however, while their autonomy may be comparable, their respective 
relationships with the Russian central governments are not. Where does Tatarstan’s 
political, economic, and cultural power come from, and what effect does Tatar autonomy 
have on contemporary center-periphery relations in the Russian Federation?  
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Introduction 
When I first arrived in Kazan, Russia in August of 2011, I could barely utter basic 
phrases in Russian. I was perplexed when dogs would board public transportation, and 
awestruck by the postcard perfect images of onion domes and minarets situated side by 
side. Over time my language skills improved and I got used to my fellow travellers, but I 
have since remained intrigued by the cultural crossroads that is the Republic of Tatarstan. 
My earliest shallow inquiries into my new locale taught me of Tatarstan’s reputation as a 
multicultural haven, but aside from noting an absence of conflict, no person, book, or 
website had been able to articulate the forms that coexistence takes in Tatarstan.  
The subterranean world of the Kazan metro weaves the city’s cultural threads 
together. The fact that the city has a metro system, however modest it may be, is 
demonstrative of its metropolitan ambitions. Built over the past fifteen years, the granite 
walls and floors appear shiny and new, paid for by the oil that lies even deeper 
underground. Brightly colored tile mosaics on the walls and ceilings depict scenes from 
Tatar folk tales. Messages over the PA system are announced both in heavy-vowelled 
Russian and feathery Tatar languages. Beneath the busy city streets, people from various 
cultural backgrounds and walks of life momentarily share the liminal space of the metro 
station. This is a place where elements of Tatar and Russian culture and daily life 
routinely intermingle and subtly influence one another.  
Contemporary scholarship about the former Soviet space tends to focus on the 
predominance of Russian power in federal governance. Soviet and post-Soviet federal 
structures are evaluated from the perspective of the political center, and in terms of the 
effects they have on peripheral subjects. For instance, explanations of the evolution of 
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national consciousness in the Soviet period frame nationality policy as something that 
was devised at and handed down from the center. According to this narrative, in the 
process of conceiving of a Soviet state after the 1917 revolution, socialist ideology 
advanced by ethnic Russians and a few members of non-Russian ethnic intelligentsias 
shaped policy, and subsequently the form of the new ethno-territorial federalist 
government. The contemporary Russian Federation is the legal and formal successor to 
the Soviet Union, and the Russian central government is frequently understood in similar 
terms as the force that dictates the terms of federalism, and passes demands down to 
federal subjects.  
While these narratives tell us about Russian authoritarianism, they largely ignore 
federal subjects as sources of data, and fail to account for the ways in which republics 
exercise their own power. First and foremost, this marks a missed opportunity to gather 
more information about how the Russian Federation functions. More than this though, 
neglecting to include federal subjects in narratives about Russian federalism creates an 
inaccurate picture of the Russian state, which has the potential to lead to inaccurate 
policy decisions. While it might be difficult to look away from the spectacle of the 
Kremlin, it is irresponsible for researchers and policymakers to neglect the valuable 
information we can gather from republics and their processes.   
Tatarstan is a particularly fruitful example to consider as a window into the 
workings of Russian federalism, and the way in which the political center’s attitudes 
towards federal subjects change over time. The Republic of Tatarstan seized the 
opportunity of the dissolution of the USSR to define its own position within the new 
Russian Federation. The republic’s insistence on establishing relations with Moscow 
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through a bilateral treaty that gave it legal status is one example of the kind of actions it 
took to achieve independence. Tatarstan spent the 1990s building the structures of a state, 
and a version of sovereignty that allowed it to operate within structures of Russian 
governance rather than separating from them as Chechnya attempted to do. Throughout 
the 2000s as Vladimir Putin’s administration has attempted to centralize power in the 
Kremlin, Tatarstan has worked to protect its unique autonomous status. Its relative 
success tells us not only about whether and how Tatarstan’s sovereignty project has 
functioned, but also about the privileges and constraints of the Russian federal center.  
Understanding the present state of Russian federalism requires a comprehension 
of the evolution of national consciousness and Soviet federalism; the contingent states of 
the contemporary Russian Federation were created through Soviet nationality policy after 
the 1917 revolution. In the 1920s and 30s, nationality was defined and instrumentalized 
in ways that attempted to advance the socialist ideological underpinnings of the new 
Soviet state. This process, and its culmination in the ethno-federalist form of the Soviet 
Union, is explained in depth in the first chapter of this project. I detail the mechanisms of 
Soviet-era nation building because these ethnocratic structures continue to form the 
foundation for Russian federalism today.  
Unequal shares of power between republics and excessive micromanagement by 
the central government characterize the Russian form of federalism. Although constituent 
states have a similar legal status, the actual extent of self-determination varies 
significantly. This asymmetry is layered because republics not only compete with one 
another for political power, but also with the Russian central government. Nikolai Petrov 
defines the subjugation of federal states to an extremely centralized government as 
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“Highly Managed Democracy.” In the Russian Federation, he identifies extreme 
centralization of power, lack of flexibility, indecisiveness, and immobility, which 
replaces democratic institutions with substitutes. Although the consolidation of Russia’s 
political apparatuses under Putin is intended to demonstrate the government’s strength, it 
actually weakens the state’s ability to respond to changing conditions. The paradox of 
federalism, and Russian federalism in particular, is that it draws power away from 
republican governments, but its ineffectiveness hinders the central government’s ability 
to counter challenges from its federal subjects. Tatarstan’s relative strength comes from 
its ability to manipulate Russia’s weaknesses while instrumentalizing certain cultural 
differences.  
Despite the Kremlin’s accumulation of power in Moscow, Tatarstan has achieved 
a great deal of political, economic, and cultural self-determination throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s. The republic’s autonomy is unmatched by other Russian federal subjects; 
although it is sometimes compared with Chechnya, the ways in which these republics 
have achieved and retained their autonomy are qualitatively different. While Chechnya 
has pursued a militant separatist path, Tatarstan has leveraged its inclusion in the Russian 
state to achieve power. In my attempt to answer the question, “Where does Tatarstan’s 
power come from?” I pay particular attention to the variety of ethnic and asymmetrical 
federalism that characterizes Russia today, and evaluate the extent to which Tatarstan has 
established some semblance of sovereignty.  
 The ethno-territorial republic of Tatarstan was originally made possible by Soviet 
nationality policies that sought to advance peoples through associations with national 
groups, and ultimately the Soviet state. The fall of the USSR in the 1990s provided 
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Tatarstan with the opportunity to seek liberation that was promised and never granted by 
the early Soviet state. While continuing to exist as a contingent member of the Russian 
Federation, Tatarstan attempted to achieve sovereignty. Throughout the 1990s, the 
republic infused the notion of self-determination into permanent structures of statehood 
such as education, economic agreements, and the built environment. Although Vladimir 
Putin’s reformation of center-periphery relations and efforts to centralize power in 
Moscow have hindered Tatarstan’s ability to achieve sovereignty in new spheres, the 
republic has largely defended its gains against the Kremlin’s encroachment. While 
Tatarstan’s cultural difference distinguishes it from territories that are primarily host to 
Russian populations, intersections and interchanges between Russian and Tatar identities 
make it possible for Tatarstan to negotiate with the federal center, and makes it 
impossible for the center to retaliate when the republic acts as a sovereign state.  
 The first chapter of this thesis explains and analyzes the evolution of national 
consciousness and nationality policy in Tatarstan under Soviet rule. This background is 
necessary to understanding the contemporary structure of the Russian Federation, and the 
ways in which Tatarstan operates autonomously within that state. The second chapter 
structures my argument by putting forth two frameworks: the nature of Russian 
federalism, and the attributes of Tatarstani autonomy. This chapter concludes by 
evaluating the extent to which Tatarstan exercises independence when compared with 
other republics. This allows me to continue by describing how Tatarstan practices 
autonomy in chapters three and four. These chapters move chronologically through the 
1990s and 2000s, and explain how the object of Tatarstan’s sovereignty project has 
shifted from policies of statebuilding in the 1990s to policies that protect the structures of 
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statehood in the 2000s. This perspective allows me to claim that Russian federal 
relationships are diverse and complex, and ultimately that Tatarstan and other republics 
possess the power to define themselves. Implicit in this argument is the assertion that 
symbolic power is indeed potent.  
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1. Soviet Nationality Policy 
In its scope and impact, 1917 was a revolutionary, paradigm-changing year for 
everyone within formerly imperial Russian territories. While the Russian-dominated 
center understood the revolution as a struggle for political power, ethnic minorities in the 
periphery viewed the struggle as an opportunity for national progress. Although the 
concept of the nation was largely limited to ethnic intelligentsia, to those with national 
ambitions the revolution represented the potential to eliminate Russian hegemony. In 
peripheral territories, the Russian Revolution played out as a national war in which 
minorities were fighting against the Russian center for independence. As Ronald Suny 
points out, however, “...ethnic and class conflicts were complexly intertwined” (119). In 
many peripheral territories, the rise of ethnic intelligentsias was a relatively recent 
development in 1917. Non-Russian elites were divided by the relative costs and benefits 
of autocratic tsarist rule and influenced by political and philosophical debates going on in 
Russia (Suny 98).  
From the revolution to the establishment of the Soviet state apparatus, Lenin’s 
priorities lay firmly in the abolition of the capitalist economy and the harmful social and 
political practices of disenfranchisement that Marxism associates with it. Envisioning a 
communist paradise on Earth as inevitable, Lenin was largely ambivalent towards “The 
National Question,” viewing national identity not as a problem in its own right, but a 
symptom of class conflict. While Stalin quickly became the key architect of the Soviet 
Union’s nationality policy, Lenin tacitly integrated it into the Bolshevik platform. 
According to him, the process of creating nationalist sentiment where none had 
previously existed “…will lead in practice to a total abolition of all national tensions…to 
	   12	  
an accelerated drawing together …of nations which will result in the withering away of 
the state” (Slezkine 419). The phrase “withering away of the state” is a direct quotation 
from The Communist Manifesto, and refers to the supposedly inevitable process by 
which boundaries of class and nation would dissolve under socialism, and bodies of 
governance would no longer be necessary.  
In contrast with Lenin’s relative disinterest in nationality, Stalin was an advocate and 
creator of nationality policy in the early Soviet period. Understanding nationality as a 
historical milestone that must be attained, Stalin viewed it not as a dividing force between 
peoples, but as a way to bring non-Russians into the fold of the Soviet Union (Martin 71). 
Through the establishment of new nationalities, he sought to raise consciousness and lift 
“backward” groups to the level of the developed Russian people. While Lenin believed 
nationality to be a temporary institution that could be instrumentalized by the revolution, 
Stalin saw nationality as a more permanent feature of governance. In his 1914 
publication, “Marxism and the Nationality Question,” Stalin defined “nation” as “…a 
historically evolved, stable community based on a common language, territory, economic 
life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture” (Hirsch 257).  On 
the one hand, most would agree that nations certainly are a product of the combination of 
these factors. On the other hand though, aside from language, these qualities are difficult 
to quantify. Historical evolution, economic life, psychological make-up, and cultural 
communities are largely open to interpretation. This ambiguity presented the state with 
the advantage of being able to reframe nationality as needed in the context of the 
changing political landscape. 
 
	   13	  
Ideology into Policy  
Although the Bolsheviks advocated for national self-determination, it was unclear 
exactly how “nation” and “nationalism” would be defined in the new system of 
government. Once the party accepted that nationality policy would be an integral 
component of the Soviet program, it became the job of anthropologists, ethnographers, 
historians, and statisticians to study the meaning of nationhood and develop a 
comprehensive definition.  Although Soviet politicians stressed the importance of 
ensuring national self-determination and promoting a formerly repressed sense of 
nationhood, they did not know a lot about the people that their policies were meant to 
protect and nurture. Therefore, it was a combination of researchers who were responsible 
for developing the definitions that would be used in future policymaking efforts. 
The definition that was cobbled together by ethnographers and politicians in the 
1920s, and included elements such as history, territory, common language, and culture 
remained relatively constant over the years. Government officials interpreted it 
differently depending on the political, economic, and ideological demands on the state. 
This had major effects on the construction of the USSR’s multi-national landscape. 
Notably, some groups emerged as dominant titular territorial nationalities and other 
groups living in the same territory were subordinate to them. Despite the fact that the 
intention of Soviet policies was to protect the right to national self-determination for all 
nations, it became clear early on that this would be unrealistic in practice. This is one 
example of how flexible interpretations of the definition of “nation” allowed for flexible 
policymaking. 
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         Distinguishing between good and destructive nationalisms was also important in 
building this flexibility and justifying the encouragement of national identity 
development. Alongside other policies that would modernize non-Russian territories, 
positive applications of nationalism would elevate the “backward” peoples of the 
federation. Negative nationalism, also known as “Great Power Chauvinism,” privileged 
larger, more advanced nations and discriminated against smaller, less developed groups. 
Many Bolsheviks believed that nations with an “unfair size advantage” oppressed smaller 
ones. Tsarist policies that privileged ethnic Russians demonstrated that destructive 
applications of nationalism could divide the peoples of the empire. The Soviet state 
interpreted nationalistic sentiments that sprouted in smaller nations as a reaction to 
repression as well as a key step in development. It was therefore construed as the positive 
nationalism that the central government sought to nurture (Slezkine 419). Allowing 
nations that had been oppressed by the Russian Empire the opportunity to develop their 
identities and equal rights within the context of the Soviet Union would help them to gain 
trust in their former oppressor and rebuild that relationship in a mutually beneficial way. 
While the state supported nation building in non-Russian peripheral territories, Russia 
already demonstrated the characteristics of the modern nation state and had no further 
developmental use for nationalism. Russian nationalism was therefore supplanted with 
allegiance to the Communist Party and the Soviet state. 
Stalin established the administrative mechanisms for managing these new 
identities in ways that were productive for the USSR. In response to Finnish and Polish 
exits from the union and threats that Ukraine and parts of Turkestan would follow, the 
People’s Commissariat on Nationalities (“Narkomnats”) was established with Stalin at 
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the helm. Although Narkomnats advocated for national rights, its purpose was also to 
mitigate nationalist challenges to the unity of the Soviet state. In the face of internal and 
external threats to the integrity of the Soviet state, Nationality Policy can be understood 
as a tactic for securing territory, loyalty, and resources from the non-Russian peripheries 
of the former empire. The Soviet State and Communist Party’s acceptance of nationality 
as an administrative necessity provided an opportunity for ethnic groups with existing 
national ambitions, such as the Tatars, with an opportunity to advance nationalist 
interests.  
In part because they were absorbed into the Russian Imperial structure of 
governance relatively early, the Tatars experienced the evolution of an ethnic 
intelligentsia and a budding sense of nationhood that other ethnic minorities did not. The 
rise of Jadidist and pan-Turkist ideologies in the mid-19th century characterized the early 
Tatar understanding of self that would become “national.” These ideologies 
contextualized Tatar folk culture as part of a larger Turkic, Islamic whole. Tatar literary 
figures like Gabdullah Tuqay participated in the active construction of a Tatar identity by 
Tatars and for Tatars through his poetry and transcription of Tatar folk tales. In Tatar 
popular culture, Tuqay is a “people’s poet,” occupying a similar position in the Tatar 
psyche as Pushkin does for Russians. Tuqay is representative of the movements that 
educated and inspired Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, a prominent Tatar socialist-nationalist in 
the early Soviet period.  
The backdrop of nationality policy was not only ideological, but also practical. 
The catastrophic violence of 1917 forced the new Soviet government to shift its focus 
away from that which was desirable in order to focus on that which was immediately 
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necessary. The overthrow of the Tsar not only threw systems of governance into chaos, 
but also disrupted the stability of everyday life for civilians. While political factions 
struggled for dominance, average communities bore the human and economic costs of 
violent conflict in Europe and the civil war raging within Russia. When revolutionaries 
toppled the tsarist regime and established the provisional government, they believed that 
they were accelerating an inevitable progression of events in which workers would rise 
up and secure political and economic control from oppressive bourgeois regimes (Sultan-
Galiev 3). They expected the revolution in Russia to kick off a global revolution, which 
would culminate in the foundation of a worldwide communist utopia (4). As a 
consequence, the Great War in Europe would be ended because its driving forces would 
dissipate under the new global order. When this did not happen, the newly established 
government staffed with inexperienced political officials was not only tasked with 
socially, economically, and politically restructuring its own territory, but also with 
engaging in violent conflicts within and outside of its borders.  
 After successfully overthrowing the Tsarist regime, factionalism within the 
revolutionary government, civilian and military dissatisfaction at the new government’s 
inability to establish peace, and a weakening of military in the trenches all threatened the 
very existence of the new Soviet state. In 1917, divisions between Marxists contributed to 
the chaos. While Marxist theory provided the foundation for the revolutionaries, factions 
arose advocating for different methods of implementing the ideological underpinnings of 
the revolution without a common enemy to unite them. Despite the democratic ideals of 
the revolution, the Bolsheviks gained power of the party and state apparatus through use 
of force in the October Uprising. Once in power, policies that created nations in non-
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Russian parts of the territory and bound those nations to the Soviet Union provided 
ideologically sound means to secure manpower and resources. 	  
     Once a definition of nationality had been established and ideologically woven into 
the mission of the Party as a necessary step in reaching global communism, it had to be 
actualized through the creation of new institutions that would foster national 
development. In the Soviet imagination, language and culture were not only understood 
as defining elements of peoples (narodnost’i), but also as tools with which to bring 
people together and disperse the message of socialism. The Bolsheviks were committed 
to ensuring the right to national self-determination throughout the Union. Although 
promotion of national identities would seem to go against the supposed universal nature 
of socialist ideology, Soviet officials justified their support for these policies by using 
nationality to adapt the message of socialism in order to make it applicable to people 
throughout the USSR. One legacy of oppressive tsarist policies was the discouragement 
of non-Russians from using their native languages in official settings (Suny 97). Lenin, 
and later Stalin, sought to remedy this perceived wrong by reversing such policies, 
instead incorporating markers of national self-determination into the official sphere 
through native language education, and national art forms. 
Under the monarchy, non-Russians did not have access to education in their 
native languages, and the vast majority of people had no access to education at all (Suny 
97). If the new government was to raise consciousness and spread socialist ideology, they 
reasoned that it would be necessary to increase access to education universally. Although 
the same Marxist-Leninist oriented curriculum was used everywhere, the new Soviet 
schools taught lessons in native languages (Slezkine 420). Until 1959 when policies 
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dictating native-language education were weakened, all students were required to study 
the titular language of their republic irrespective of their own nationality (Gorenburg 37). 
This ensured that large proportions of each ethnic group maintained a connection with 
their culture and traditions (39). Native-language education required the development of 
an “ethnic intelligentsia” to interpret traditions and culture for a modern socialist 
audience. Academies and institutions developed for the purpose of not only studying, but 
also producing the culture of ethnic groups. For most groups these were the first secular 
academic institutions, and they facilitated the creation of national histories, literatures, 
and arts (39). Institutions that drew people towards one titular national identity distanced 
them from other groups, and encouraged or forced people belonging to minor 
nationalities to assimilate. 
Promoting national languages and cultures was of particular importance in 
“nativization” policies (korenizatsiia), which encouraged people to connect with their 
national roots. Learning from the ineffectiveness of inconsistent and unreasonably harsh 
tsarist policies in non-Russian parts of the old regime, Soviet officials realized that force 
of will would not effectively spread socialist ideology. Bolshevik revolutionaries 
understood that the process of transforming each individual citizen from a religiously or 
tribally identified person to socialist Soviet citizen was bound to each of the numerous 
republics. Connecting people through regional territorially bound national identities was 
a primary step in this process (Suny 116). In many areas, state officials seized on local 
languages and cultures as potentially effective tools in spreading the message of 
Communism; likewise the Communist Party claimed that language and other cultural 
“forms” were devoid of essential, ahistorical meaning. Rather, they were superstructural 
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expressions of a given historical consciousness, and so contained no unchanging or 
immutable ethnonational essence. If the promotion of certain cultural forms had the 
potential to canonize national content that worked against the progress of universal 
socialism, then the division of form and content preserved the universality of Leninist-
Marxist ideology alongside the cultural uniqueness of national groups. According to this 
logic, it was acceptable to use native cultural forms to promote socialist messages 
because “there was no such thing as national content” (Slezkine 418).  
The use of the veil in formerly Muslim territories as a symbol of modern 
nationhood illustrates this crucial ideological separation of form and content. In the 
Soviet context of nation building, the veil was ideologically disentangled from the 
religion of Islam, so that it could be embroidered by Soviet policy makers with national 
cultural meaning. Because the nation form confers modernity to a given ethnoterritorial 
group on the global stage of History, the veil as a symbol of nationhood demonstrated 
modernity in a way that veils of sacred or personal meaning could not; from a Marxist-
Leninist perspective, these other proprietary forms were understood as regressive. The 
veil therefore was branded national in form only as long as it expressed national 
sentiment, and therefore contained socialist-historical--and not “pseudo-eternal” 
religious--content. It is worth mentioning here that while the veil is imbued with a 
historical consciousness of its own, the actual historical subjects—women wearing the 
veils—are deprived of theirs.  
Policy Into State 
Connecting people through regional territorially bound national identities was at the 
foundation of the Soviet model of Federalism. Through the establishment of nationality 
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as a category of classification and the fostering of nationally specific cultures, the Soviet 
regime worked to instill a sense of national identity in places where it had never existed 
before, and connect those identities with Soviet state structures.  
Perhaps the greatest triumph of nationality policy was that it changed the way 
people identified themselves. In part, this was due to the incorporation of nationality as a 
category of classification. Prior to the establishment of the Soviet Union, people would 
commonly select their socio-economic status, religion, or locality as their primary 
identifying characteristic. After the revolution, nationality became a classification that 
was used in censuses and on internal passports. These systems required individuals to 
choose a national identity. In other words, “It is reasoned that these institutional steps 
virtually forced upon each citizen an ethnic awareness (and indeed an ethnic identity) 
which he might not otherwise have had” (Simonsen 1071). 
In the early years of the Soviet Union, theoretically every national group would 
have the same institutions and protections to foster their identity development. In 
practice, however, subordinate identities were assimilated or eliminated. Ethnic groups 
that were small in number or failed to demonstrate the development and modernization 
that rationalized the Soviet state’s support for nationality policy were encouraged, 
sometimes forcefully, to assimilate with titular national groups. In “solving” the 
“nationality question,” rigid boundaries were established between peoples; however, 
these policies played into the long-term goals of eventual homogenization of the Soviet 
Union (Simonsen 1072). This was achieved through a combination of utilitarian policies 
that progressively narrowed the list of recognized nationalities. 
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In 1927, 172 nationalities had obtained “official status” (Hirsch 255). In contrast, 
only 57 of the largest nationalities were reported on the 1939 census results—a decrease 
of 155 titles (276). Between the time when the Soviet Union was founded and the late-
1930s, the vocabulary and definitions that had been established in the early 1920s 
remained more or less constant (267). However, the process of consolidation resulted in 
the emergence of certain dominant nationalities and other subordinate ones. 
Consolidation was a combination of processes of assimilation of smaller and larger ethnic 
groups, and the elimination of groups from the list of recognized nationalities. According 
to Francine Hirsch, this happened in two steps. First, the Soviet state apparatus made a 
distinction between “major” and “minor” nationalities. Then the state emphasized the 
differences between “narodnosti” (peoples) and “natsional’nosti” (nations), leading to the 
rise of territorial titular nations (277). 
     After the first list of nationalities was created in 1927, ethnographers were asked 
to create a list of “major nationalities” (Hirsch 264). For the most part, distinguishing 
between major and minor nationalities was a function of limited time and resources. It 
would simply be too inefficient to analyze detailed statistics for each of the 172 nations 
that had obtained official status. The method of data consolidation had a huge impact on 
the results of this practice: instead of totaling the number of people identifying with a 
national group within the union, data was localized regionally. This means that even if an 
ethnicity had a formidable union-wide presence but members were widespread (as was 
the case for ethnic Jews, for example), they would appear as minor rather than major 
nationalities in regional data (265). Creating a new list of major nationalities did not only 
mean highlighting the groups with the highest membership, but also included the much 
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more complicated task of merging smaller groups that shared similar traits with major 
nationalities (264). In some cases, people who had already begun to develop a connection 
to a smaller developing identity were urged or forced to re-identify as the territorial 
dominant nationality and assimilate. For example, until the 1930s the Talysh people 
living in the Azerbaijani ASSR had their own schools and press, but the Talysh were 
consolidated with the Azerbaijanis as the list of nationalities was narrowed 
(Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization). 
         The second phase of consolidation was the distinction between narodnosti 
(peoples) and natsional’nosti (nations). Soviet definitions organized these terms in a 
hierarchy in which all nations were peoples, but not all peoples were nations. Narodnosti 
were still developing as a cohesive, modern group, while natsional’nosti had already 
reached a higher level of evolution. Leading up to the 1937 census, if a group had not 
“made the leap” from narodnost’ to natsional’nost’, they would not make it onto the list 
of official nationalities, instead being “relegated to the ethnographer’s dustbin” (Hirsch 
267). This was an ideologically motivated decision-making process that reflected the 
ideals of modernization and spreading socialism through nationality policy. In other 
words, focusing on developed national identities (natsional’nosti) highlighted the 
successes of Soviet policy, and eliminating groups that had not elevated themselves 
erased what might be perceived as a mistake. Of course, a “modern” nation would be one 
that had developed “consciousness” and adhered to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Therefore, 
groups that had not modernized and were still considered “backward” by the Soviets 
were categorized as narodnost’i rather than natsional’nosti (267). The Tatars benefitted 
from their early integration into the Russian Empire, which eventually allowed for the 
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growth of an ethnic intelligentsia. In the early Soviet period, this elite group, and 
especially individuals like Mirza Sultan-Galiev, contributed to the high status of the Tatar 
people within the paradigm of Soviet nationality.   
The failure to be categorized as a natsional’nost was characterized by a palpable loss 
of benefits and privileges that were reserved for nations. In this phase, consolidation was 
not so much a co-integration of national identities, but an elimination of those that did not 
meet Soviet standards and therefore could not belong to the Union as independent 
republics. Although distinguishing between nations and peoples seems to betray Lenin’s 
initial promise to restore rights to every nation, it is in fact this designation that also 
affirmed Lenin’s promise. The Soviet state was successful in ensuring that groups 
defined as natsional’nosti received the representation and rights that the state promised to 
them. Narodnosti did not have the right to territory, autonomy, involvement in 
government, schools, newspapers, etc. because they were not nations, and the Soviet 
regime therefore had no obligation to ensure these things. 
     Nationality policy was a key component of the Soviet Union’s comprehensive 
program of social revolution. Despite seeming contradictions with Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, fostering nationalism provided a backdrop for the development of socialist 
institutions in non-Russian territories of the USSR. The effect of these policies was to 
change the way that individuals identified themselves; instead of associating with a social 
class or religion, people began to connect with a shared national identity, and with the 
political regime that had created it. Nationalism was a new concept in the Soviet 
borderlands, and policies that intended to allow national identity development actually 
created the identities that emerged and decided which ones would not. Academic 
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analyses of the Soviet nation-building process, including those I have included in this 
chapter, frequently depict a model where national identity is handed down to non-Russian 
minorities by a Russian-dominated metropole. While nationality policy was indeed an 
instrument of the center, ethnic groups were active participants in the creation of their 
national identities. If we understand the contemporary Russian Federal system to be, in 
part, the descendent of its Soviet predecessor, we should interpret it not only as a hyper 
centralized/consolidated federal model, but also one in which minority groups have the 
power to define themselves. 	  
 While existing research on center-periphery relations focuses on the center, this 
research seeks to take stock of the data that might come from republics, and establish an 
alternative understanding of the ways in which nationality have played out both as a 
Russian tactic to unite disparate and diverse territories, and as a mode by which some 
ethnic minorities in Russian-ruled spaces have been able to secure relative autonomy. 
The Republic of Tatarstan, located in the Volga River basin, has achieved unprecedented 
levels of autonomy while existing as a contingent part of the USSR, and now the Russian 
Federation. Comparisons have been drawn between Tatarstan and Chechnya in regards to 
the political, economic, and cultural autonomy they exercise on their respective 
territories. While their autonomy may be comparable, however, their respective 
relationships with the Russian central governments are not. Where does Tatarstan’s 
political, economic, and cultural power come from, and what effect does Tatar autonomy 
have on contemporary center-periphery relations in the Russian Federation? 	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2. Framing Tatarstan’s Sovereignty Project:  
Federalism and Power 
 
Soviet Legacy  
 
Now that we have established the ways in which socialist ideology shaped the 
Soviet state, I will explain how the legacy of the Soviet ethno-federalism shapes the 
contemporary Russian Federation. When the governing apparatus of the USSR was 
dissolved in 1991, the ethno-territorial pseudo-state structures underpinning its federal 
model remained largely intact and formed the basis for the new Russian Federation. 
Territorial borders and titular nationalities were largely unchanged as a new federative 
government coalesced on Russia’s still-expansive and diverse territory. In the new federal 
order, Tatarstan has achieved its uniquely autonomous status within the Russia through 
alternating phases of state creation and state maintenance. The establishment of Tatar 
systems of governance during the Yeltsin presidency can be explained as an exercise in 
state building, wherein Tatar politicians and activists created the foundational attributes 
of a state in Tatarstan.  
In the age of President Putin’s efforts to centralize power in Moscow, the Tatar 
mentality has shifted to protecting the gains made in the 1990s and maintaining the 
structural elements of statehood. This pattern suggests two things about the nature of 
Tatarstan’s relationship with the Moscow; first, that despite the Soviet state’s 
construction of ethno-territorially based nations and Russia’s subsequent adoption of a 
federal structure of governance, nation-building is a dialogic process in which the 
national group that is being “built” is active and has agency in its own construction and 
definition. Secondly, it contrasts the adaptability of federal subjects when compared with 
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the legislative and executive apparatuses of the federal center. In the case of Tatarstan, 
the republic is able to respond to political challenges from the center with agility, while 
Moscow is hindered by sheer volume and structural clumsiness. This chapter establishes 
two frameworks through which I propose to advance my thesis. First I consider what 
Nikolai Petrov’s concept of Highly Managed Democracy means for republics like 
Tatarstan.  Then I ask how we can measure Tatarstan’s independence in relation to the 
political center and other federal subjects. These questions set the stage for subsequent 
chapters to examine how and why Tatarstan has achieved and protected its unique status 
within the Russian Federation.    
Contemporary Russian Federalism  
Federalism is a subdivision of government within a territory where local, regional, 
national, and supranational levels of government share responsibility and power. Federal 
systems are inherently contradictory, seeking to legitimize expansionist ambitions by 
unifying otherwise fragmentary states and attempting to reconcile unity and difference, 
and security and freedom. Despite the efforts of federations to protect the right of 
peoples’ self-determination, Serge Sur argues that, “There is no federalism without a 
federator” (225). In many Western contexts federative systems carry democratic 
implications, but Sur suggests that a federation is simply an iteration of empire. 
Federations simultaneously weaken central authorities by devolving powers to state or 
regional bodies, and strengthen them by harnessing territories. The case of the Russian 
Federation illustrates this phenomenon; the necessary devolution of power to republics 
stifles the central government’s ability to act, but strengthens Moscow by maintaining its 
authority over a massive swath of territory. On the other hand, when the federal 
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government accrues power that did or could belong to republics, it also takes on 
responsibilities that can overwhelm it. Russia’s control over its territory is therefore 
accomplished through a process of governing that is closely supervised by the center, and 
only nominally democratic.   
 Through the development of flexible vocabularies of nationality in the 1920s and 
30s, the Soviet government and non-Russian ethnic minorities manufactured national 
identities. Though the emergence of these identities was contingent on the exclusion of 
others, the consolidation of the Soviet State and the Communist Party allowed for the 
successful integration of a multinational territory into a coherent union of states for 
nearly 75 years. This unity relied heavily on the structures of governance created and 
operated by the centralized party apparatus, and was not resilient enough to survive the 
dissolution of the metropole that cemented it together. As the Soviet Union fell to pieces 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the erosion of the union was reflected in ethnically 
motivated conflicts and demands for independence. In the chaos of the early 1990s, the 
federal structure seemed to be the only viable option for Russia’s weakened central 
government to appease the periphery and maintain control and security in its territory. 
Just as non-Russian groups understood the 1917 revolution to be an opportunity for the 
advancement of national priorities, some national groups viewed the breakup of the 
USSR as a potential opening. Similar to the early Soviet period, territorial vastness and 
ethnic divides provided the basis for a federal system in Russia in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the basic structures of federalism were already in place and could be co-
opted by a new government. In line with Serge Sur’s understanding of federative states, 
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the Russian central government used the devolution of power to republics in order to dull 
separatist sentiment and maintain control over territory.  
 While federalism in the 1990s was marked by decentralization of power and 
responsibility to republican governments, the 2000s have been marked by the opposite 
trend as the Putin administration centralizes power in Moscow. Specific policies that 
have subdued the periphery to the government of the Russian Federation have included 
the removal of the “against all” option on electoral ballots, the establishment of regional 
governments that are under the direct control of the central government, and the abolition 
of elected republican governors between 2004 and 2012. Russian federalism is inherently 
asymmetrical; despite identical constitutional status, republics do not have equal shares of 
power. The centralization of power in Moscow adds another of inequality to the Russian 
federal system. Republics are not only in competition with one another, but also with 
Russia. Inequality between republics can therefore be understood as their unequal ability 
to resist or bargain with Moscow.   
 Nikolai Petrov calls the Russian political regime a “Highly Managed Democracy” 
(HMD). This does not mean that the present model of government is democratic, but 
refers to the “protodemocracy of the Yeltsin period, which later evolved toward 
‘managed democracy’” (35). Petrov identifies extreme centralization of power, lack of 
flexibility, indecisiveness, and immobility as key characteristics of this model of 
government, which replaces democratic institutions with substitutes and quashes “fail-
safe mechanisms” like media and non-governmental organizations. Under Vladimir 
Putin’s administration, he sees centralization “beyond the limits of rationality and 
effectiveness” that creates an unstable model of governance (ibid.) Lacking the systems 
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of checks and balances that allow governments to be responsive to changing conditions, 
HMD is clumsy and unable to adjust to new circumstances (38). The overloaded central 
government does not have “...an objective and high-quality expert-analytical foundation 
for making decisions and designing effective mechanisms to harmonize interests,” 
limiting the effectiveness of the central government in relations with its federal subjects 
(43). Petrov argues that Highly Managed Democracy is unstable and unsustainable, and 
that the regime will slip either into full-blown authoritarianism or democratization. He 
finds the second option to be more likely (35). Paradoxically, HMD has drawn political 
power away from republican governments, but by overloading the Kremlin, it hinders the 
central government’s ability to counter challenges from its federal subjects. Tatarstan’s 
relative strength comes from its ability to manipulate Russia’s weakness in this regard.  
Tatarstan’s Sovereignty Project 
 
Tatarstan’s sovereignty project began in earnest with the rise of nationalist 
activism in the late Soviet period, from the 1980s until the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991. The dissolution of the government of the RSFSR led to the decentralization of a 
formerly excessively centralized governing apparatus, and local and regional bodies 
absorbed responsibilities and powers. This period of decentralization is characterized by 
Boris Yeltsin’s notable quote, “Take as much sovereignty as you can ingest” (Graney, 
Kahns 18). In 1990 Tatarstan adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar 
Soviet Socialist Republic, which dissolved the Tatar ASSR and established the Republic 
of Tatarstan. This simple, brief document provided the foundation for the construction of 
a Tatar republic post 1990, and for political and economic relationships between 
Tatarstan and the Russian central government.  
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The use of the word “sovereignty” in the context of Tatarstan leaves little 
ambiguity around the republic’s ambitions; Tatarstan does not seek some abstract notion 
of autonomy, but actual statehood on equal footing with the Russian federal state 
apparatus. In her book, Nation, Language, Islam: Tatarstan’s Sovereignty Movement, 
Helen Faller argues that the 2000s have seen this objective eschewed, as the republic 
does not continue to advance its sovereign status. Although Tatarstan’s goals may have 
shifted from building new elements of statehood to protecting already extant ones, the 
ideal of sovereignty plays no less of a role in the republic’s relations with Moscow. 
Power sharing between Moscow and Tatarstan is far from equilibrium, but this does not 
mean that the central government wields unbridled control over the republic of that 
Tatarstan’s sense of sovereignty and practice of statehood has dissipated.  
 Tatarstan has attempted to achieve sovereignty by building the functional 
mechanisms of a state, even those that usually belong to a central government. Sovereign 
ambitions encapsulated in the structural elements of statehood outlast shifts in the 
political landscape.  Katherine Graney explains the ways in which Tatarstan has 
constructed itself as a state by “looking like a state,” “providing like a state,” and “acting 
like a state” (Kahns 55, 62, 71). In other words, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the 
Republic of Tatarstan served the basic functions associated with sovereign statehood 
despite its ambiguous legal status as a contingent member of the Russian Federation. It 
accomplished this by establishing the symbolism of statehood in public spaces, levying 
taxes on citizens and providing them with services in return (i.e. education), and 
establishing relationships with foreign governments independently of the Russian 
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Federation. This last activity is especially peculiar because foreign affairs are almost 
always delegated to central governments of federations.  
 There are two predominant perspectives in contemporary scholarship on 
Tatarstan. One interprets Tatarstan’s status and resulting power as a primarily economic 
arrangement based on the region’s revenue from oil and various industries. Other 
scholars contend that this interpretation does not account for the importance of the 
region’s commitment to its unique culture, history, and national character. Both of these 
analyses view Tatarstan’s independence as a formality of minimal consequence. In my 
estimation of Tatarstan’s self-determination that follows, I emphasize that the republic’s 
relationship with the federal center is both economic and cultural. Furthermore, I 
highlight the very real, practical implications of Tatarstan’s symbolic and discursive 
power. Tatarstan is measurably stronger than other peripheral republics, and strong 
enough to exert pressure on the Russian government.  
It is worth noting here that “sovereignty” and “independence” do not always 
cause progressive democratization. Like Russia’s federal government and the 
governments of a great many former Soviet territories, Tatarstan’s government suffers 
from corruption and cronyism. In 2002 it was estimated that Shaimiev’s closest relatives 
held the most lucrative jobs, “...controlling up to 70% of the republic’s economic 
potential” (Makarychev and Valuev 10). Political opposition within Tatarstan is 
extremely limited, and the media is heavily controlled. Critics of republican sovereignty 
in the former Soviet space argue that federal subjects have “...tended to use their new 
powers and authorities to build autocratic and indeed ethnocratic regimes” (80).  
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Measuring Tatarstan’s Autonomy 
 In his discussion of the need for a methodology to analyze and understand 
Russia’s regions, Rostislav Turovskii puts forth a plan that incorporates three “axes” with 
“consolidation-competition,” “center-regions,” and “democracy-authoritarianism” as 
their respective poles. Here I will use Turovskii’s “center-regions” scale to measure the 
extent of Tatarstan’s autonomy today. This will provide the basis for my discussion of 
why and how the republic has achieved such a unique status in Russia. In order to 
ascertain where a republic falls on the scale of autonomy from the center of political 
power, Turovskii suggests a series of questions. “First, how well developed is federal 
control over the state structures of the region, who exercises this control, and how?” (43). 
In Tatarstan, federal control over state structures is exercised primarily through the 
application of federal legislation and occasionally through more decisive action. For 
example, Moscow requires that federal laws must be reconciled with the laws of the 
central government. In theory, this is a mechanism by which the central government can 
use the federal legislative process to temper republics like Tatarstan. Although 
Tatarstan’s constitution says that the president of the republic can only be elected by the 
people of the republic, Putin’s 2004 federal reform gave Moscow the power to appoint all 
regional heads of state (Turovskii, “Governors” 59). However, Dmitry Medvedev, who 
was the president at the time, nominated Rustam Minnikhanov at the request of his 
predecessor, Mintimir Shaimiev. Although the Kremlin’s laws are applied to the semi-
autonomous republic, Tatarstan is in a unique position to negotiate over its interests. 
Therefore central influence is not exercised unilaterally as it is in weaker regions.  
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The second question Turovskii asks is “How well developed is the region’s 
representation at the center?” (Turovskii, “Regimes” 43). Tatarstan maintains a 
plenipotentiary representative in Moscow who works with federal authorities on issues of 
interest to the republic, and participates in the drafting and review of legislation that 
would affect the region (Republic of Tatarstan “About the Plenipotentiary Representation 
of the Republic of Tatarstan”). Russian authority over Tatarstan is not only mitigated by 
officials in the region, but also by regional officials operating in the center. Whereas 
other republics that do not have representation in Moscow are disadvantaged by the 
geographic distance between center and periphery, the presence of a republican 
representative at the center lends itself to a closer relationship with the federal 
government. This is, in part, what explains the difference in power between weaker 
republics like Mari El and stronger republics like Tatarstan.  
Thirdly, Turovskii says that we must consider the geographical origin of the head 
of state and other top regional officials (43). Most notably, Tatarstan’s president, Rustam 
Minnikhanov, is an ethnic Tatar from the village of Rybnaya Sloboda. Local Tatarstanis 
occupy many top federal positions in the republic, including Ildus Nafikov in the office 
of the prosecutor general, Asgat Safarov in the ministry of internal affairs, and Renat 
Timerzyanov in the office of the chief federal inspector. Ethnic Tatars hold high offices 
in the republican government and are responsible for making decisions that might 
otherwise be delegated to Russians.  
Level of financial independence is the last criterion that Turovskii uses to 
ascertain a region’s autonomy from the federal center. It is in this sector especially that 
Tatarstan has excelled. As a resource-laden region with a strong industrial sector, 
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Tatarstan is one of the most economically developed regions in Russia. Its level of 
financial autonomy has ebbed and flowed as the relationship between the republic and 
central government has shifted, but Tatarstan has continually controlled a large 
proportion of the revenue it generates. One of the best examples of Tatarstan’s current 
level of financial independence is the republic’s relationship with the oil and gas 
company, TatNeft. While most petroleum companies in Russia are either owned by the 
Russian state or have strong connections to the Kremlin, the government of Tatarstan 
maintains a “golden share” in TatNeft, giving it the power to outvote other shares in 
certain circumstances.  
Despite challenges to Tatarstan’s autonomy between the 1990s and 2000s, the 
republic has maintained the power to define itself, to govern itself, and to represent itself 
in Moscow. Russian federalism’s asymmetry and micromanaged nature consolidate 
power at the political center. While this limits the ability of republics to govern 
themselves, the influx of responsibility in Moscow overwhelms the central government, 
and challenges its ability to react when republics act defiantly. Now that I have 
established the asymmetry of Russian federalism, I will discuss the ways in which 
Tatarstan defines and defends its uniquely independent position in the Russian 
Federation. Chapter three evaluates the Tatarstani process of building the mechanisms of 
statehood in the 1990s, and chapter 4 discusses efforts to protect these mechanisms in the 
face of Putinist centralization.  
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3. The Tatarstani Sovereignty Project in the 1990s	  	  
The Russian Center in the Early 1990s	  	  
 While Western narratives of the collapse of the USSR often highlight and 
celebrate iconic events like the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet State 
apparatus left a void of uncertainty for its contingent states and the people living in them. 
Reconstruction of political mechanisms, the challenges of converting a state-controlled 
economy to a market-based one, and the social changes brought about by the introduction 
of capitalism characterized the 1990s as a particularly turbulent time in Russia and the 
territories of the former Soviet Union. The systems of governance that had unified the 
vast and disparate lands of the Soviet Union no longer existed, and it was far from clear 
what the replacement for those structures would be. Uncertainty grew as some republics 
terminated their relationship with the Soviet Union. Starting with Lithuania in 1990, the 
Baltic states were at the forefront of the movement for independence from the USSR. 
Yeltsin inherited the challenges of maintaining cohesion that Gorbachev struggled with in 
the late Soviet period. 	  
 After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia sought to maintain its international 
status as a great power. An interstate system based on non-intervention sets the stage for 
the existence of great powers because larger states that possess economic and military 
strength exercise global influence (Zacher 215).  Internal cohesion is key in the 
production of this economic and military power, and it allows states to project an image 
of strength abroad. Federative agreements with republics helped to reestablish Russia’s 
international image after the fall of the Soviet state by devolving power to republics while 
ensuring that they would not separate from Russia. In this regard, it mirrored the way in 
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which Soviet federalism was brought about in part by administrative necessity. The 
structures established in this period (the 1920s in particular) were inherited by the 
Russian Federation, along with their asymmetrical and ethno-territorial nature.  	  
 Assuming the presidency in 1991, Boris Yeltsin’s strategy of devolving power to 
republics cemented the positions of peripheral territories within Russia and relieved 
pressure on the financially and politically troubled central government. With Moscow 
occupied by macro political and economic issues, it made logistical sense for republics to 
take over some administrative responsibilities. On the one hand, this provided an 
opportunity for national-territorially bound republics for which the Soviet project was 
restrictive rather than liberating to claim unprecedented levels of independence. On the 
other hand though, post-Soviet restructuring was fraught with financial, organizational, 
and political problems at all levels of governance. Russia’s asymmetrical model of 
federalism led to inequality between republics; while non-Russian territories were treated 
like states, ethnically Russian sub-state structures were treated as administrative districts 
governed almost solely by the central government (Hughes). The challenge of economic 
transition was accompanied by sharp increases in poverty, unemployment, homelessness, 
addiction and alcoholism, mental health issues, and HIV/AIDS (Lyons). Despite 
increased autonomy, most republics were struck by the financial crisis and lacked the 
funding to provide the social welfare that was in higher demand and no longer supported 
by Moscow. While this restructuring was a disadvantage for many territories, it was in 
this period of devolution that the well-resourced republic of Tatarstan reclaimed revenue, 
ethnic heritage, and political autonomy.   	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 This chapter will examine the steps that the Republic of Tatarstan took in the 
1990s to establish itself as a sovereign state within the nascent Russian Federation. First I 
contextualize Tatarstan’s claims to sovereignty as a movement that is inspired by but 
separate from the “Parade of Sovereignties” initiated by the Baltic states. Then I analyze 
the legal basis for Tatarstani sovereignty. The next section of this chapter illustrates 
Tatarstan’s sovereignty project through three structures that confer statehood: economic 
control, education reform, and the creation and incorporation of state symbols in the built 
environment. This allows me to demonstrate that throughout the 1990s, the Tatarstani 
strategy of achieving sovereignty was to encapsulate it in permanent institutions. 	  
Tatarstan in the 1990s	  
Tatarstan took advantage of the instability and uncertainty of the Soviet State to 
make legal and political moves towards sovereignty in 1990. Moscow was not only 
distracted by crises that threatened the central government, but also those that 
compromised the cohesion of the union. In what has come to be known as the “Parade of 
Sovereignties,” the USSR lost six union republics in 1990--the three Baltic states, 
Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia. Tatarstan’s claim of sovereignty in the 1990 
Declaration of Sovereignty differed from the independence movements of these states. 
Even though the Declaration of Sovereignty claimed that the soviet of the Tatar SSR 
would be the supreme governing power, the existing Tatar state as a subject of the Soviet 
central government merely took a new form. In other words, this document did not 
establish Tatarstan’s complete independence or separation from Russia. While some 
states on Russia’s borders followed separatist paths, Tatarstan remained a contingent part 
of Russia. The fact of the territory’s geography made separatism an impractical option for 
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Tatarstan, but it has a demonstrated ability to accrue power and avoid violent conflict 
with the Russian center. In response to challenges from the center, Tatarstan brokers 
compromises with Moscow that are in the best interests of the republic. At times it 
continues to function as a state without federal permission. This is particularly significant 
in contrast with Chechnya’s pursuit of independence through war. 	  
The political and administrative decentralization of the 1990s provided the Tatar 
ASSR with the opportunity to claim its independence from Moscow. Although 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics had stronger self-determination than other 
administrative units like okrugs and oblasts that are typically ethnically Russian, they 
were still a contingent part of the Russian SFSR, and lacked the privilege granted to 
union republics (SSRs) to disassociate from the union (Pipes 43). The Tatarstani claim to 
sovereignty therefore had to negotiate this legal distinction. The Tatarstani sovereignty 
project was fueled by dissatisfaction as much as it was by opportunity. Disappointed in 
the empty early Soviet promises of self-determination, minority nationalist activists 
across the RSFSR were inspired and aided by the growing movements and successes in 
the Baltic States (Graney, Kahns 15). Perhaps most importantly, the government and 
populace of the Tatar ASSR were becoming increasingly disillusioned by the economic 
inequality between the richly resourced republic and the metropole. Of the 25 trillion 
rubles that the robust Tatarstani economy produced per year, 80% was siphoned off to the 
Union, 18% to the RSFSR, and 2% remained in the republic (Tagirov 230). Tatarstani 
sovereignty therefore sought to manipulate opening political channels to reverse 
perceived historical, cultural and economic wrongs and realize the international norm of 
self-determination in a meaningful way. President Shaimiev’s reclamation of the 
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republic’s economy and rejection of shock therapy allowed Tatarstan to provide a higher 
standard of living than other Russian territories. Clearly conscious of this, Shaimiev has 
said, “Due to the sovereignty we have been able to develop our own economic and social 
policies: a more reasonable privatization program, stopping the decline in oil production, 
to develop an agricultural program that fulfills basic food needs, and adopt a program of 
targeted social protection of the population…Our sovereignty works in the interests of 
humanity” (Shamiev 2002).  
The first legal step in achieving autonomy was the adoption of the Declaration on 
State Sovereignty on August 30, 1990. In the midst of the chain of political crises that 
would lead to the fall of the Soviet State, the Tatar ASSR declared its sovereignty. The 
declaration converted the Tatar ASSR into the Tatar SSR (union republic), claimed the 
Tatar state soviet would be the highest governmental authority in the territory, and 
provided the basis for the constitution of Tatarstan (Declaration on the State Sovereignty 
of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic). The republic accomplished this without 
Moscow’s permission, and in a way that had legal standing. Although the Declaration of 
Sovereignty reveals Tatarstani ambitions for independence from Moscow, this brief 
document does not detail how these abstract ideals would be put into practice. For 
example, although the declaration asserts that, “Tatar SSR guarantees all citizens of the 
Republic equal rights and freedoms,” it does not go into further detail about how those 
rights and freedoms would be secured (ibid). Furthermore, the Declaration of Sovereignty 
stipulated that the newly founded Tatar SSR would abide by the laws of the RSFSR in the 
time elapsing before a constitution was ratified, which did not occur until 1992. 	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Declaring sovereignty is one thing, but making change on the ground is quite 
another. For Tatarstan in the 1990s, sovereignty was not an objective that could be 
accomplished, but an ongoing process that involved establishing state-like structures, and 
defining and redefining what it means to be sovereign within a Russian-ruled space. It is 
in this context that Tatarstan established a legal basis for sovereignty. Although the 
Declaration of State Sovereignty states that the Tatar SSR would prepare to sign a 
bilateral treaty establishing relations with the RSFSR, this process was complicated and 
spanned three years. In 1992, the republic held a referendum to establish the legal status 
of the state. With 81.6% voter turnout, 61% of the electorate, which included Tatars and 
Russians, voted for Tatarstan to become “a sovereign state and subject of international 
law” (Gabidullin and Edwards). Ten days after the referendum, President Mintimir 
Shaimiev declined to sign the Russian Federal Treaty that he had previously agreed to 
“for fear that [Tatarstan] might lose its sovereign status” (Graney, Kahns 35). Shaimiev 
and other Tatarstani officials now called for a bilateral, equitable treaty with Russia. 
Despite Yeltsin’s acclaimed support for sovereignty projects, he was operating under the 
assumption that appeasing nationalist sentiments would make them easier to tame and 
bring into the Russian-dominated fold once he was in power. Tatarstan’s refusal to sign 
the treaty drew the Russian president’s ire; Yeltsin warned that Tatarstan’s rejection of 
the agreement “presupposes that Tatarstan is not part of Russia” (ibid). It was not until 
1994 that Tatarstan and Russia entered into a formal legal agreement (Treaty on the 
Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authorities Between the 
State Bodies of Power of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of Power of the 
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Republic of Tatarstan) establishing the republic as a sovereign state “associated” with 
Russia, and delegating certain powers to the central government (Graney, Khans 39). 	  
Consisting of at least five documents, the legal foundations of Tatarstani 
sovereignty are riddled with ambiguity, complexity, and redundancy. This “legal chaos” 
poses challenges to the governance of the republic, but Tatarstan has deftly and 
adaptively manipulated the conditions of its position in the federation in order to 
maximize empirical and symbolic self-determination and minimize Moscow’s meddling. 
In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan’s insistence on the 
primacy of republican legislation over federal, and use of legal autonomy to build 
practical structures associated with statehood, the republic has secured an unprecedented 
amount of power as a federal subject of the Russian Federation. Throughout the 1990s, 
the outcome of this strategy largely favored Tatarstani interests and completely avoided 
violent conflict with the Russian center.  	  
Recipe for a State 	  
 With the legal basis for Tatarstani autonomy in place, the republic had to 
transform the language of sovereignty into a living reality.  Highlighting Tatarstan’s 
cultural distinctiveness was a key element of this project from early on. Originally there 
were two separate versions of the Declaration on State Sovereignty: one focused on 
reforming the relationship between the Tatar ASSR and the RSFSR, the other on 
reforming the relationship between Tatar and Russian languages in the republic (Tagirov 
232). This fact demonstrates a consciousness among Tatarstani elite that legal and 
cultural sovereignty would need to be bridged.  
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Due to the heterogeneity of Tatarstan’s population, emphasizing cultural 
distinctiveness required the reconciliation of ethnic Tatar and Russian interpretations of 
the history of the territory. According to Tatar historiographies, the middle Volga region 
is a historic ethnic homeland, and the Tatars only lost control of the region due to Slavic 
aggression and violence. Many ethnic Russians viewed Tatarstan as a part of Russia, and 
credit European Slavic influence with the cultural, social, and economic development of 
the region. Therefore, the republic’s sovereignty project hinged on the development of an 
inclusive cultural identity that conceptualized ethnic Tatar history and culture in a 
broader multicultural context that would appeal to Russians and non-Russians alike, and 
on the development of a political identity that did not separate the republic from Russia. 
Speaking on the 10th anniversary of the Declaration of Sovereignty, President Shaimiev 
upheld the idea that, “Sovereignty is not directed against Russia or its integrity, and does 
not claim the authority of the federal center. It is necessary for us to organize our lives in 
accordance with the features that exist in this country” (Shamiev 2002). Therefore, 
Tatarstan’s founding documents, and political, economic, and cultural reforms 
underscored the uniqueness of the republic in a way that appealed to and benefited those 
who did not identify as Tatar. In other words, it was possible to be Tatartsani regardless 
of affiliation with an ethnic identity.   
Economic Autonomy	  
Recalling that economic grievances were an important motivator in the Republic 
of Tatarstan’s claim to sovereignty in 1990, it makes sense that economic arrangements 
between the center and periphery are significant sites of struggle and indicators of 
autonomy. Through the 1994 bilateral treaty with Russia and a number of auxiliary 
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documents, Tatarstan negotiated nearly complete autonomy over the tax code, control 
over natural resources, and power-sharing over defense industries in the republic (an 
economic sector that the central government would administer in most circumstances). 
Whereas the federal government controlled taxes in most republics, until 2000, Tatarstan 
was allowed to levy its own taxes and send a percentage of the money to Moscow. Of 
particular importance to the Tatarstani economy is the agreement with Russia regarding 
gas and oil production, and the vertically integrated holding company Tatneft. The 
republican government owns a “golden share” of the company (56%), giving it a majority 
vote in any major decision (Terentyeva).  Because the republican government had 
jurisdiction over the economy, it was able to stabilize it as Russia transitioned into a 
market-based economy, saving many from the instability experienced in other regions as 
a result of Yeltsin’s catastrophic shock therapy. 	  
Some scholars like Laurence Hanauer praise Tatarstan’s model of “economic 
sovereignty” for avoiding the “emotionally charged rhetoric” of ethnicity that 
characterized the conflict in Chechnya (Jeffries 347).  It is certainly true that Tatarstan 
has drawn political power from the economic resources it possesses. The republic can 
literally and figuratively afford to oppose Russia when necessary. Throughout the 1990s, 
Tatarstani officials returned to the economic agreements of the 1994 treaty again and 
again in defense of republican sovereignty. President Shaimiev credited the treaty with 
“stabilizing the political situation” with Russia.  For example, although the tax code was 
renegotiated after Putin came to power, the government of Tatarstan has used this 
agreement to maintain its control over Tatneft, the republic’s largest oil company. By 
using indirect rather than direct action against the metropole, the republic asserted 
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autonomy and resisted complete centralization. Although Hanauer distills Tatarstan’s 
autonomy into a purely economic agreement, given the way in which Tatarstan has 
actually leveraged its economic position in conjunction with comprehensive social and 
cultural reforms, I suggest that there is more to the republic’s sovereignty project than 
money. 	  
Education Reform	  
The establishment of “national” schools in the 1920s and 30s had been an 
important part of the Soviet doctrine of “korenizatsiia.” These schools taught classes in 
the native language of the regions they operated in, but the curricula were centrally 
dictated by Moscow, making them “national in form and socialist in content.” In the 
wake of the dissolution of the USSR, the reimagining of national education that included 
national curricula became a tool in the effort for discursive and material sovereignty in 
the republics. Katherine Graney tells us that the language of sovereignty was frequently 
applied to education reforms in Tatarstan in the early 1990s. Examining the republican 
educational initiatives gives us insight into the nature of Tatarstani aspirations for 
sovereignty. Discourses on education reveal tensions that exist between ethno-centric 
elements of sovereign Tatarstani identity and a commitment to multiculturalism. From 
language to history to literature, education reform in the republic prioritized Tatar ethnic 
identity. Concurrently though, new curricula also emphasize a territorial, civic approach 
to understanding nationality, which is inclusive of all ethnicities (Graney, “Education” 
622). Politically, republican educational reform was publicized as an improvement of 
education for all students, elevating it to an internationally accepted level. Despite efforts 
to construe the nation as territorial, multiethnic, and primarily civic, the parallel dialogue 
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of reclaiming academic subjects holds special significance for Tatars, the titular territorial 
nationality.  	  
 In the case of Tatarstan, education reform was based primarily on language 
education, and history, literature, and hard science curricula that incited republican 
values. Mandatory Tatar language education for all students regardless of ethnic identity 
was intended to create a culture of “functional bilingualism” in the republic. In addition 
to language, education reform included changes to most subjects in the interest of 
“...relocating the production of cultural and historical knowledge away from Moscow and 
to the republics” (Graney, “Education” 614). In Tatarstan textbooks and courses were 
redesigned to reflect a “Tatarstani” interpretation of history, include Tatar authors, poets, 
and cultural figures, and coursework on the ecology and geography of the republic (615-
16). Although science may be a seemingly neutral subject, educational reforms in the 
sciences were centered on those subfields that were pertinent for future economic 
development--namely the oil and chemical industries (614). Although education reform 
benefitted students regardless of ethnicity, proactive encouragement of Tatar perspectives 
in education may not always apply to Russian students. For example, although all 
students are encouraged to learn Tatar, “...the asymmetry of the language 
policy...encourages young Tatars to develop a unified ‘national’ identity, combining 
language, ethnicity, religion and other elements, which is not matched by the policy as it 
affects young Russians, who neither expect to speak Tatar nor are likely to express their 
identities in these terms” (Veniguer and Davis 187).  
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Building the Nation: The Foundation 	  
 Markers of statehood are not only functional, but also symbolic. Tatarstan’s 
pursuit of sovereignty therefore included the creation of symbols that represent the 
republic. According to the National Library of Tatarstan’s website, “A state’s existence is 
impossible without the presence of state symbols to personify its state system, social 
features, the historical development of its society, and the customs and traditions which 
have developed within it.” In 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan 
approved a new coat of arms designed by a special commission tasked with developing 
new republican symbols. This coat of arms features the national colors, red and green, 
and a winged snow leopard (ak bars in Tatar), a figure from Tatar folklore. Since the 
adoption of this crest, it has been incorporated into public and official spaces throughout 
the republic such as subway stations and government buildings.	  
 In addition to integrating new symbols into existing spaces, the Republic of 
Tatarstan has also projected its sovereignty through the creation of new buildings and 
spaces. The Kul Sharif Mosque was built during a particularly productive period in the 
history of Tatarstani autonomy. Planning the mosque began in 1997 under the watchful 
eye of Mintimir Shaimiev, president of the republic and key figure in the Tatar 
sovereignty project. The mosque is the embodiment of Shaimiev’s core plan to “build the 
nation” by incorporating expressions of national identity in the built environment 
(Graney, Kahns 99). The decision to build the mosque within the white walls of the 
Kazan Kremlin was more than an effort to balance the official representation of religion 
in a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional republic.  
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The location of the mosque is significant to Tatars because it is adjacent to the 
alleged site of the original mosque of the Kazan khanate, which is said to have been 
burned down and replaced by the Annunciation Cathedral when the city was conquered 
(Villum). On the one hand, rebuilding the mosque recognizes the long history of Tatar 
culture and lifestyle in the region, and makes a statement by including that identity in the 
official space of the Kremlin. On the other hand though, building the mosque in the 
Kremlin positions it firmly within the Russian structure of federal governance, and 
symbolically solidifies Tatarstan’s role within the Russian Federation. Tatarstan is unique 
in its ability to work within the prescribed federal structure and incorporate ethnic 
Russians and elements of Russian-ness into its identity, though it is unable to fully 
accomplish this. The Kul Sharif Mosque is not only a symbol of this relative autonomy 
for ethnic Tatars, but also a demonstration of the ways in which Tatar and Russian 
identities are woven together. 	  
Official and Unofficial Dimensions of Tatarstan’s Statehood	  
 Tatarstan has achieved an unprecedented level of autonomy within the Russian 
Federation. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yeltsin’s positive attitude toward the 
devolution of power to republics presented Russia’s periphery with an opportunity to 
practice self-determination in a much more meaningful way than during the Soviet 
period. This window of opportunity combined with existing discontent with Russian and 
Soviet governance provided the backdrop for Tatarstan to seek sovereignty. From 1990-
1999, Tatarstan’s sovereignty project included the establishment of the legal foundations 
for statehood, such as the Declaration of Sovereignty, the constitution of the republic, and 
the Federative Agreement with the Russian state. Public officials took steps to translate 
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words on paper into actual functions of statehood. The government of the republic 
reclaimed revenue that would have been redistributed previously, education reform 
introduced national values to the classroom, and the state proactively incorporated 
symbols of Tatarstani nationality into the built environment. 	  
For Tatarstan, the 1990s were a decade of national development, in which the 
elements of statehood were produced. The Republic of Tatarstan did not officially 
become a state and never separated itself from Russia. Instead, it maximized its own 
autonomy and independence in practice while avoiding provoking the Russian Federation 
into potentially negative retaliation (Graney, Kahns 34). Tatarstan’s strength as a federal 
subject of the Russian Federation comes from its bargaining power, which was especially 
developed during the 1990s.  
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4. Tatarstani Sovereignty and Power in the 21st Century 
Vladimir Putin’s Administration and Changing Federal Dynamics 
 Formerly a ranking member of the KGB, Vladimir Putin joined Boris Yeltsin’s 
administration in the mid ‘90s and quickly worked his way into the executive office of 
the federation. He became acting president in 2000 when Yeltsin resigned, and 
subsequently won the presidential election with ease. Along with economic growth and 
stability, reforming relations between Moscow and the regions quickly became a 
hallmark of Putin’s first presidency. In addition to being credited with the “pacification” 
of Chechnya, he spearheaded an overarching policy of centralization that was intended to 
bring power back to the federal government through measures like “harmonizing” 
regional and federal laws, and appointing regional leadership rather than holding popular 
elections.  
Despite Putin’s manifold efforts to consolidate political and economic power, the 
centralization of the 2000s was by and large confined to the path of decentralization of 
the 1990s. The amalgamation of power at the metropole was far from a comprehensive 
policy; it was a negotiated ad hoc approach. Just as regions had established relationships 
with the federal center individually and asymmetrically, the undoing of these agreements 
was undertaken individually and asymmetrically (Gel’man 11). Even when the federal 
legislation was passed to bring peripheral republics into line, it was applied selectively, 
allowing some states to maintain relative autonomy. The uncoordinated policy of 
centralization throughout the 2000s has exacerbated inequality between territories, 
leading to a federal system in which some republics like Tatarstan are in a position to 
negotiate with Moscow. Where does Tatarstan’s power come from? And how do certain 
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republics maintain relative independence in the face of increasing centralization? What 
does this dynamic tell us about the Russian federal center?  
Tatarstan in the New Russian Federalism 
With Vladimir Putin’s ascension to office in 2000 came monumental shifts in the 
structure of the Russian state, particularly in the changing relationships between Moscow 
and the regions. Due to the 1994 power-sharing agreement between Tatarstan and the 
Russian Federation and other supplementary economic agreements, life in the Republic 
of Tatarstan was very different than life throughout Russia. Under Putin, however, the 
resurgence of central authority was a top priority, which hinged on the elimination of 
differences between administrative units. In order to achieve this, a cascade of policies 
was handed down from Moscow intending to “harmonize” republican legislation with the 
central government’s and severely limit the power of stronger republics like Tatarstan. 
Although Putin’s administration(s) have made it difficult for Tatarstan to establish new 
forms of autonomy, the Russian metropole has had a difficult time destroying the 
republic’s existing infrastructure that conveys independence and power. Tatarstan’s 
negotiating power may have been tempered, but it is still significant.  
As the relationship between Russia’s federal government and Tatarstan changed, 
so too did the understanding of Tatarstani sovereignty. Strictly interpreted as an 
international norm, sovereignty was already out of reach in the 1990s, but centralization 
under Putin made it a more definite impossibility. Some debate whether the republic’s 
relative independence can be considered sovereignty at all. Scholars Helen Faller and 
Katherine Graney diverge on whether Tatarstani sovereignty was ever realized. While 
Faller argues that the start of the 2000s marked the end of the Tatarstani sovereignty 
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project, Graney suggests that the spirit of sovereignty lives on in the republic. I agree 
with Graney that sovereignty has remained the Tatarstani objective in the face of political 
centralization, but this requires a broad and flexible interpretation of the term. In the 
context of Tatarstan this word cannot be understood as a complete divorce from the 
Russian political and economic systems, but it does connote a power to broker 
compromises that other regions would have no hope of negotiating.  
Whereas the fall of the Soviet Union created an opportunity for the Republic of 
Tatarstan to take on new responsibilities and define its political powers, the 2000s have 
been devoted to protecting the gains made in the 1990s. Tatarstan’s privileges are largely 
encapsulated in the structures of statehood. Because political institutions, industry and 
taxes, and symbolic representations of cultural identity play necessary roles in society 
and by nature have a certain permanent quality, they are not easily erased by Russian 
centralization. For example, although the Russian government successfully blocked 
legislation that would change the Tatar alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin in 2001, Tatarstan 
is still the republic that spends the least time learning Russian in schools because of the 
mandate that all students must master Tatar (Derrick 55). Tatarstan has maintained a 
nearly unprecedented amount of bargaining power in the Russian Federal political 
system.  
Economic Sovereignty: Tatarstan’s Petrostate 
Tatarstan’s continued role in regulating its own economy is an important element 
of the republic’s sovereignty in the 2000s. Scholars like Helen Faller and Matthew 
Derrick suggest that the republic’s privileged economic position guards against 
discontent in other areas as the central government reclaims certain powers. In other 
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words, Tatarstan’s sovereignty is limited to its economic rights. While economic self-
determination is important in and of itself, I understand it to be intimately connected to 
other important mechanisms of sovereignty. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, 
the republic’s economic independence reinforces and is reinforced by other forms of 
autonomy. The wealth generated by the republic’s industries funds the structures that 
allow for its independence from the federal center. In turn, Tatarstan’s autonomy allows 
it to manage its own economy.  
Tatarstan’s changing relationship with the federal center challenged its economic 
autonomy. In his first year as president, Vladimir Putin discovered that that the republic 
had been committing tax fraud, sending only 6-7% of taxes to Moscow instead of the 
30% agreed upon in 1994. After a closed-doors meeting with Tatarstani President, 
Mintimir Shaimiev, “...Tatarstan immediately agreed to cede at least 50% of the revenues 
generated on its territory to Moscow, which, as in Soviet times, were not redistributed 
back to the republic” (Faller 11). In the years that followed, subsequent changes to the 
Tatarstani tax code engineered by Moscow sought to hollow the region’s autonomy 
(Derrick 52). Despite these challenges to the republic’s economic independence, 
Tatarstan has continued to enjoy more control over its industry and economy than other 
republics.  
 The Tatarstani government’s role in the oil and gas industry, the top generator of 
revenue in the republic, illustrates the close relationship between government and 
economy in Tatarstan. Recall that the government of Tatarstan gained a 56% share in 
Tatneft, the largest oil and gas business in the republic, through a provision in the 1994 
power-sharing deal with Russia. Although the bilateral treaty has since been revoked, the 
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republican government has retained its “golden share” in the company, a majority share 
that allows it to make business decisions that are in the interests of the republic. In the 
2000s, the growth of small oil companies, often under the umbrella of Tatneft, has both 
complicated the economic landscape and reinforced Tatarstan’s economic autonomy and 
power, enhancing the republic’s ability to resist the advances of the Russian center.  
 According to A.N. Tokarev (writing in 2013), “The gas-petrochemical 
complex...currently provides more than 60 percent of the republic’s industrial output and 
about 65% of the profit” (Tokarev 50). Tatarstan’s official economic policy hinges on 
stabilizing the production of oil; however, this is hindered by the fact that Tatarstan’s oil 
production is “mature,” meaning that the republic’s most accessible oil fields are being 
quickly depleted. As hard-to-recover oil and high viscosity crude oil constitute larger and 
larger percentages of Tatarstan’s natural resources, demand for innovations in the 
retrieval and processing industries rises. Tokarev details the role that small oil companies 
are taking on in response to this need. Small companies do not operate independently; 
many of them operate on contracts from Tatneft, and are motivated by governmental 
incentives in the form of tax benefits. As these companies benefit from government 
incentives, they contribute to the state’s goal of stabilizing oil production and maximizing 
the use of difficult-to-access and near-depleted oil fields. In the case of the oil and gas 
industry, the republic’s investment in the largest company and manipulation of incentives 
to promote innovation in the industry keeps Russian influence largely out of the 
Tatarstani oil market, and the Tatarstani economy more broadly.  
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Political Representation 
 Helen Faller argues that Tatarstan’s sovereignty project has lost the intensity that 
characterized it in the 1990s. Particularly as the federal government encroaches on the 
rights and responsibilities of the republic, Tatarstan remains a fully integrated component 
of the Russian Federation and has made no real gains in terms of territorial sovereignty. 
This analysis hinges on a comparison of Tatarstan’s faculties with those of the Russian 
Federation. Focusing instead on a comparison between Tatarstan and other ethnic 
republics within Russia, we might establish a different conclusion. Putinist policies to 
draw power back to Moscow have challenged the supreme authority of the republican 
government and the documents that establish it; however, through alternating programs 
of cooperation with and resistance to Moscow, Tatarstan has maintained much of the 
political autonomy it accrued in the 1990s.  
Throughout the 2000s, the republic has blatantly neglected to engage in the 
process of legislative “harmonization” spearheaded by Moscow. Tatarstan continues to 
operate through laws and administrative structures that do not align with the central 
government’s regulations. One recent example of republican disobedience that has 
caused uproar has to do with a Russian law dictating that only the president of the 
Russian Federation is eligible to use the title “president.” While nearly all other republics 
have changed their regulations to abide by this guideline, Tatarstan refuses to give up the 
title. Despite fury from the center, there is little that Moscow can realistically and 
intelligently do to halt the republic’s seizure of symbolic power. This is especially true 
because Tatarstan is a republic that Moscow has explicitly endorsed as a positive 
example of cooperation between peoples.  
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 Despite the Kremlin’s efforts to reestablish supreme authority on republican 
territory, in many ways Tatarstan’s close relationship with Moscow gives the republic an 
advantage in political negotiations. Even though Tatarstani heads of state Mintimir 
Shaimiev and Rustam Minnikhanov have both been proponents of sovereignty, they have 
also gained a certain amount of respect and trust from Moscow, which they have 
leveraged for the benefit of the republic. Russia’s tacit approval of the pro-sovereignty tilt 
of Tatarstan’s leadership was highlighted in 2010 when regional elections were 
suspended and regional governorships and presidencies became appointed positions 
under Putin. While Muscovites were appointed to positions all around Russia, Rustam 
Minnikhanov, Shaimiev’s hand picked choice for the position, became president of the 
republic. Not only has Moscow allowed Tatarstan to have native representation within 
the republic, but Tatarstan is also represented at the center. The Plenipotentiary 
Representative of Tatarstan advocates for the republic’s interests in the federal legislative 
process, an advantage that few other republics have. Additionally, Tatarstan has opened 
consulate-like operations abroad, and manages independent ties with a number of 
countries including Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Iran. In light of the recent cooling of 
Russian-Turkish relations, Tatarstan has openly defied orders from the Russian 
government to cut ties with Turkey (Whitmore, “Tatarstan and Belarus”). Tatarstan’s 
insistence on keeping its plenipotentiary representative in Istanbul is an overt 
demonstration of the republic’s unprecedented power in Russia.  
Islam as a Symbol of Cultural Difference  
As a symbol of cultural difference, Islam has been officialized and 
instrumentalized as a part of the Tatarstani nation-building and sovereignty-seeking 
	   56	  
processes. Scholars frequently comment on the resurgence of religious practices in 
former Soviet spaces after 1991. A significant amount of academic attention has been 
given to Islam in particular, in part due to rising Western anxieties about the religion in 
geopolitical contexts. Tatarstan has been used both as an example of interreligious and 
interethnic cooperation and peace, and as a perceived breeding ground for threatening 
extremist varieties of Islam, especially Saudi Arabian wahabbism. Although not all 
Tatars are Muslim (some are baptized Orthodox Christians, and a small minority hold 
alternative religious beliefs), Islam’s place in Tatarstani nation building is contested 
terrain. The resurgence of Islam after the fall of the Soviet Union has brought into 
question, which kinds of religious practices are “native” to Tatarstan, and which varieties 
are “foreign.”  
Following the Soviet period of a-religiosity, many people throughout the Russian 
Federation have returned to religion as a marker of ethnic and cultural identity. The 
Volga Tatars trace their heritage back to the Volga Bulgars, “...a medieval Turkic people 
who have inhabited the middle Volga and lower Kama region since around the eighth 
century when they began converting to Islam” (Karimova 40). Therefore, the “Tatar” 
variety of Islam is understood to be the Hanafi tradition that was passed down from the 
Bulgars, and which is frequently perceived as the oldest and most liberal school of Islam 
(madhhab) (ibid.). In a republic where Tatar and Russian populations are nearly equal, 
the cultural practices of each group intersect and influence one another. This combined 
with the suppression of religion of the Soviet era may have an effect on the perceived 
liberalness of Tatar Hanafi religious practices. Certain observable cultural habits point to 
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the synthesis of Russian and Tatar ways of life.  For example, although Islam prohibits 
the consumption of alcohol, some Muslim Tatars choose to drink.  
Although Hanafi religious practices are the most prevalent among observant 
Tatars, there is a significant minority of religious Tatars who have different religious 
practices. Those who are often educated abroad in Arabic countries or learn from 
individuals who are educated abroad, are more likely to adhere to literal, conservative 
interpretations of Islam. Because Tatar identity is connected to a particular understanding 
of the religion, stricter interpretations of Islam cause anxiety among Tatar nation-builders 
who believe that Hanafi practices and values are the only ones appropriate for the Tatar 
people. Tatar Islam symbolizes Tatarstan’s cultural difference from Russia, which 
provides justification for the republic’s relative independence. Simultaneously though, a 
version of Islam that is distinctly Tatar differentiates it from other predominantly Muslim 
republics like Chechnya and Dagestan, and eases anxieties about the republic’s autonomy 
within Russia. For this reason, the version of Islam that is “branded” as Tatar is generally 
tolerant of and accepted by non-Muslims, promoting cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence between Tatars and Russians.  
Building the Nation Continued: The Scaffolding 
 The previous chapter introduced the Kul Sharif Mosque the incorporation of 
symbols of Tatarstani autonomy into the built environment. This section elaborates on 
that theme, describing how the mosque encapsulates a version of Islam that is understood 
to belong specifically to the Tatars.  The complex of the Kazan Kremlin lies at the top of 
a long sloping hill. Tourists stroll up the European-style cobbled streets, passing the 
Tatarstan National Museum. Outside of the entrance to the Kremlin at the top of the hill 
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is a towering statue of the famous Tatar poet Mussa Jalil freeing himself from the chains 
of fascism. Entering the pristine white gates of the Kremlin, the bright blue tiles that 
cover the roof and minarets of the Kul Sharif Mosque reach up to the sky. The 
Annunciation Cathedral, which was built after the conquest of Kazan by Ivan IV in 1552, 
sits adjacent to the mosque. The blue of its onion dome is more of a navy than the 
turquoise sported by the mosque, and it is dulled by hundreds of years of snowfall and 
sunshine. These contrasts between ancient and modern, Tatar and Russian, and East and 
West that exist in the Kazan Kremlin have played out in a sovereignty project that 
attempts to accommodate all of these tensions in a comprehensive sense of the national.  
Although the Kul Sharif Mosque can accommodate up to 6,000 prayer-goers, the 
vast prayer room is usually mostly empty, and the building functions primarily as a 
museum and tourist site (Villum). Although the mosque symbolizes the preservation and 
assertion of Tatar culture in the context of Russian federal relations, it serves a primarily 
non-Muslim, non-Tatar constituency. Locals and tourists visit Kul Sharif to admire the 
architecture, and learn about the history of the republic through the various historical 
artifacts displayed in the museum (ibid.). The mosque does not act as a purely functional 
site, but as a site that French theorist Pierre Nora would designate as a site of memory 
(“lieu de memoire”). Encapsulated in Kul Sharif is a conscious “will to remember,” 
which, according to Nora, elevates the object above history and into the realm of the 
memorial (Nora 19). The Kul Sharif Mosque seeks not only to preserve the history of 
Tatar identity as it was before 1552, but as a constructed representation of the ideal Tatar 
identity in the mid-1990s when it was conceived (Villum). The placement and function of 
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the mosque demonstrate that Tatar national and political identity, while defined in 
contrast with Russia, also incorporates elements of Russian-ness.  
Evaluating Tatarstan’s Power 
 Confronted with Moscow’s efforts to centralize power that was formerly devolved 
to republics, has Tatarstan sacrificed real power for empty symbols? Although the nature 
of Tatarstan’s independence has changed as the political goals of administrations have 
shifted, the republic maintains significant political, economic, and cultural autonomy. 
While the 1990s provided an opportunity for Tatarstan to define its position within the 
nascent Russian Federation and build the features of a state, the republic has defended 
that position in the twenty-first century. Because the republic is geographically and 
politically close to the Russian federal government, there is no real possibility for it to 
establish complete independence. On the other hand though, this closeness maintains 
Moscow’s trust and the institutionalization of Tatarstan’s power makes it difficult for the 
capital to fully neuter the republic. Furthermore, Tatarstan’s symbolic power is an 
important feature, and shouldn’t be dismissed or discredited. Political scientists Barnett 
and Duvall identify four distinct types of power, and although they vary qualitatively, no 
type is quantitatively more powerful than another. Through symbols like the Kul Sharif 
Mosque, the republic exercises discursive power to define itself and its position within 
the Russian Federation. This is significant given the obstacles that stand in the way of 
other republics that might hope to do the same thing.  
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Conclusions  
 This thesis has questioned how periods of history (the Soviet period, 1990s, and 
2000s) have shaped Russian Federalism. Nationality Policies in the 1920s and 30s 
established an ethnoterritorial version of federalism in the USSR that would theoretically 
restore the power of self-determination to non-Russian peoples of the union. However, 
the consolidation of state and party apparatuses and the resulting centralization of power 
in Moscow limited the ability of republics to exercise real authority and control their own 
governance. Nationality once again became a source of political power as the Soviet 
Union dissolved in the 1990s. If we understand the Russian Federation as the successor 
of the USSR, the federal form of governance can be understood as an inherited structure. 
As Union Republics (SSRs) claimed independence from the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Moscow leveraged federalism to secure power over its remaining 
territories. For Yeltsin, devolving power to republics was a tactic to appease republics 
and encourage them not to renounce their membership in the Russian state. It is quite 
possible that the first president of the Russian Federation did not expect republics like 
Tatarstan and Chechnya to take such a big bite when he stated that they should “take as 
much sovereignty as you can ingest.”  
 When Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, first as acting president and then 
occupying the position more permanently, empowering the central government of Russia, 
and the executive branch in particular, became a priority. Redefining the central 
government of the Russian Federation required bringing republics back into the purview 
of the Kremlin by “harmonizing” regional and republican laws with the supreme law of 
the federation, replacing regional leadership with trusted figures (often hailing from 
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Moscow), and reclaiming control over elements of governance like taxes and social 
programs.  
 Tatarstan’s unique status within the Russian Federation makes it a logical place to 
study changes to the federal system. Tatarstan is distinct among republics due to the 
amount of autonomy it possesses, and the ways in which it obtains and maintains that 
independence. In contrast with Chechnya, which has sought independence from Russia 
through violent rejection of the hegemonic power, Tatarstan negotiates and manipulates 
its position within the Russian Federation to achieve autonomy. While Tatarstan has 
certainly been forced to make sacrifices and compromises (especially as Putin’s 
administration centralizes power in Moscow), the republic continues to operate as a 
politically, economically, and culturally distinct territory. It leverages its cultural 
uniqueness and political power against perceived Russification.  
While the Tatarstani sovereignty project may have lost the vigor that fuelled it in 
the 1990s, Tatarstan exhibits notable independence when compared with other ethnic 
republics and with the federal center itself. Not only does Tatarstan advance its interests 
more effectively than other republics, but it also conducts its affairs in ways that make it 
nearly impossible for Moscow to intervene intelligently and effectively. In other words, 
Tatarstan pushes the boundaries of autonomy set by the Kremlin, but makes compromises 
when necessary. These compromises generally benefit the republic even if its leaders 
cannot achieve the full extent of their agenda. Struggles over language education policy 
illustrates this phenomenon; although the federal center might desire for the republic to 
spend less time teaching Tatar language and focus instead on Russian, there is little it can 
do to intervene. In Chapter 4 I discussed how Moscow hindered the republic’s efforts to 
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change the alphabet of the Tatar language to Latin to more closely mirror its Turkic roots. 
Despite blocking this specific expression of sovereignty, Tatarstan continues to uphold its 
education policy of functional bilingualism.  
 Alongside my assertions about how the Republic of Tatarstan obtains and protects 
its independent status, this project attempts to address questions about the nature of 
Russian federalism more broadly. I have established the ways in which the Russian 
federal model has changed over time, but there are two elements that remain relatively 
constant in all three historical periods that I evaluate. First, Russian varieties of 
federalism are firmly grounded in ethno-territorialism. This can be contrasted with 
American federalism and the European transnational federal model. Since the 1920s, the 
units that comprise the Russian federal structure are based on the connection between a 
non-Russian ethnic group and a delineated territory that is constructed as a homeland 
even if that ethnic group is dispersed throughout the territory. Second, Russian federalism 
is asymmetrical, and that asymmetry is present on two levels; though republics share the 
same constitutional status, the actual power they wield in the federal system is various. 
The second dimension of this asymmetry has to do with the power differential between 
peripheral republics and Moscow. Understanding these attributes, how should scholars 
and policymakers evaluate Russian federalism?  
 Until now, most research about Russian center-periphery relations has focused on 
the metropole. Building on a framework developed by Rostislav Turovskii, perhaps 
examining the ways that republics relate to the central government is a valuable way to 
evaluate the state of Russian Federalism. Working on the unique case of Tatarstan, this 
thesis attempts to propose an approach that recognizes the power of republics to define 
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themselves, marking a shift from the study of center-periphery to periphery-center 
relations. In the second chapter of this thesis I explained Nikolai Petrov’s estimation of 
“Highly Managed Democracy.” Petrov says that Russian governance is centralized 
beyond rationality or efficacy. Because it is overburdened, the federal center can’t always 
react to political action at the republican level that it tries to regulate. It is in the context 
of this tension that republics define themselves. Petrov argues that HMD is unstable and 
unsustainable, and that the Russian Federation will slide either towards authoritarianism 
or democratization. In either case, from a perspective that prioritizes the state of 
republics, his argument does not address the problem of authoritarianism or ethnocracy at 
the substate level. Examining the connection between these strata of governance is a 
possible future direction for this research.  
 At this moment in time there are a number of forces that could drive unforeseen 
developments in the state of Russian federalism. In April 2016, Putin announced the 
creation of a new National Guard that would answer directly to the president. He has 
called the Guard “...a new body of federal power” (BBC, “Putin creates new national 
guard”). Although analysts largely agree that the reshuffle is intended to protect the 
political establishment from popular unrest, particularly with parliamentary elections 
nearing, there is speculation from Kremlin-watchers like Paul Goble that the new security 
force is intended to rein in Ramzan Kadyrov. Depending on how this policy plays out, 
and on how politically strong republics respond to it, this development could have 
ramifications on the future of Russian federalism. This is only one example of an event 
that is currently in flux and could fundamentally influence the Russian federal model. As 
such situations unfold and scholars and policymakers respond to changes in internal 
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Russian political relations, I recommend that special attention be paid to the positions and 
actions of republics. As this thesis demonstrates, they are important indicators and actors 
in federal relations.  	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